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TORTS-ABROGATION OF THE FELLOW-SERVANT
DOCTRINE IN MUNICIPALITIES-STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Poniatowski v. City of New York, 141 N.Y.2d 76, 198 N.E.2d
237 (1964)
Appellant, a New York City police officer, was injured while
serving as a recorder in a police car. The car was operated by a
fellow officer and in pursuit of another vehicle at the time of the
collision. The Trial Term rendered a verdict for the plaintiff
policeman while the Appellate Division reversed the judgment on
the law and dismissed the complaint.1 HELD: Reversed. The
Court of Appeals held that the statute2 waiving the common law
immunity of a municipality from liability for negligence in the
operation of its vehicles extended protection to fellow officers
as well as to the public. Poniatowski v. City of New York, 14
N.Y.2d 76, 198 N.E.2d 237 (1964).
The primary issue is whether or not the New York legislature
intended to abrogate the fellow-servant doctrine 3 while waiving
the immunity of the city from suit by third parties caused by
the negligence of its officers.4 The applicable portions of the
statute maintain:
Every city.., shall be liable for the negligence of a person
duly appointed by the governing board or body of the
municipality . . . to operate a municipality owned vehicle
within the state in the discharge of a statutory duty imposed
upon the municipality, provided the appointee at the time
of the accident or injury was acting in the discharge of his
duties and within the scope of his employment. Every such
appointee shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed
an employee of the municipality .... 5
1. Poniatowski v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. Supp.2d 770 (App. Div.
1963).
2. N.Y. GEN. MUNICIPAL LAW §§ 50a, 50b.
3. "Unless the parties have made an express contract to the contrary, the
general rule at common law and in the absence of statute otherwise providing
is that a master is not liable to one servant for injuries caused by the negli-
gence of a fellow servant." 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 321 (1948). Accord,
Whisenhunt v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 195 S.C. 213, 10 S.E.2d 305
(1940).
4. At common law, police officers were not regarded as municipal employees
but rather as municipal agents or servants, thereby relieving the city of
liability on the doctrine of respondent superior. Matter of Evans v. Berry,
262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933).
5. Supra note 2.
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A subsequent portion of the statute points out that the city
shall be liable and shall assume the liability for the negligence
of the operation of the vehicle.
The Appellate Division determined that the relationship of the
two officers was that of fellow-servants within the meaning of
the fellow-servant rule. The Court of Appeals accepted this de-
termination. Almost all jurisdictions would hold that the status
of the officers was that of fellow-servant at common law. The
Appellate Division went on to hold that the fellow-servant
doctrine constituted a complete defense at common law and that
the rule was not abrogated by statute.6
One of the dissenting justices argued that the statute did make
the city liable and that Robinson "v. City of Albany7 had so held.
The Robinson case held that the fellow-servant doctrine was
waived by the statute, but the case was not controlling since it
was from an intermediate court.
Another dissenting justice insisted that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent and therefore barred from recovery. This
contention is of little weight as the issue is the liability of the
city under the statute and not the liability of the officer. The
dissent viewed the situation as an attempt to expand the already
existing common law fellow-servant doctrine but the issue is
whether or not the existing doctrine has been abrogated. The
question, however, is the liability of the city under the statutes
which deem all such officers as employees of the municipality.
Without the statute the city would be immune from suit for
negligence at common law on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case held that the statute
did waive the defense of the fellow-servant doctrine. In so
holding, the court looked into the purpose of the statute and then
accordingly construed its meaning towards effecting the intention
of the legislature. The court reasoned that the legislative in-
tention was to overcome the hardship visited upon those injured
through the negligence of municipal officers who would otherwise
be without a remedy. The statute was, therefore, interpreted to
mean that only the operator of the vehicle was deemed to be a
servant and that passengers remained agents as at common law.
The operator and his injured passenger, consequently, would not
bear the relationship of fellow-servant to each other. Thus, the
6. Supra note 1.
7. 218 N.Y. Supp.2d 421 (App. Div. 1961).
196,1]
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doctrine barring recovery would be made inapplicable under the
statute.
The court further contended that they had followed similar
reasoning before in allowing policemen to recover from the
municipality when injured by fellow officers. In citing Viseman
v. City of New York" to support this reasoning the court relied
on the doctrine of assumption of risk rather than the fellow-
servant doctrine.
The court in the instant case emphasized in its decision the
inherent injustice of not allowing one to recover for injuries in-
curred as a result of the negligence of another solely because
the other happened to be a fellow servant.
The dissent contended that the majority was avoiding a rule
by reviving another that had been superseded. The common law
rule of respondeat superior which considered a police officer as
an agent of the municipality rather than as an employee was
abandoned with the waiver of immunity by statute. 9 Since the
statutory waiver, municipalities have been held liable for negli-
gence of police officers on a master and servant basis.10 For
such a holding the officers must be considered as employees and,
therefore, servants of the municipality thus making the reason-
ing of the majority clearly erroneous. The dissent further recog-
nized that the fellow-servant rule is antiquated, and should, per-
haps, be abolished by the legislature rather than by the judiciary.
Following the maxim that "statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law should be strictly construed" the Court of Appeals
undoubtedly reached an incorrect decision in extending the statu-
tory relief granted to private persons to fellow officers as well.
The Court in an attempt to circumvent a harsh common law
rule used liberal statutory interpretation to effect justice. The
problem had been before the court previously but had been
avoided. In City of Albany v. Standard Ins. Co." the Court
of Appeals was faced with almost identical facts with the ex-
ception that the liability of an insurer, whose policy was to save
the city harmless from the negligence of its employees, was in
issue. The court evaded the question of the liability of the city
and decided the case on the basis of the intention of the con-
tracting parties. The Robinson case 2 arose from the same occur-
8. 10 N.Y.2d 952, 224 N.Y.S.2d 275, 180 N.E.2d 57 (1961).
9. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIr[S ACT § 8.
10. Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E.2d 338 (1955).
11. 7 N.Y.2d 422, 198 N.Y.S.2d 303, 165 N.E.2d 869 (1960).
12. Stpra note 7.
[Vol. 16
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rence and the city was held to be liable to the injured fellow
servant by the Appellate Division.
Certain areas of the law must change as society changes. The
law of torts is perhaps the area of the law most susceptible to
judicial change through decisions. Other areas of the law, such
as the law of contracts and the law of real property, require
strict adherence to the rule of stare decisis in order to promote
security and justice. The fellow-servant doctrine has long been
recognized as harsh and has been recognized by some as
"wicked". 13 One court described the rule as resulting in "gross
injustice" and as "callous to human rights".14 In order to
ameliorate some of the rigors of the harsh doctrine, constitutional
provisions have abrogated or modified the common law fellow-
servant doctrine in many jurisdictions. These modifications are
usually in the more hazardous occupations and the validity of
these statutes have been upheld by the courts.15 While statutes of
this character are in derogation of the common law and, there-
fore, not to be extended by implication,'" it has been held that
they should be liberally construed to effect the purposes for
which they were enacted.' 7 The underlying policy of such pro-
visions is to stimulate employers to exercise greater care for the
safety of employees.
In view of the foregoing statutory modifications of the fellow-
servant doctrine and the rule of statutory construction that such
statutes should be liberally construed to effect the purposes for
which they were enacted as enunciated in Jamison v. Encarna-
cion,18 the decision of the Court of Appeals extending recovery
to fellow servants could easily be justified as being the legis-
lative purpose embodied in the statute.
The decision in the instant case should definitely influence the
South Carolina law on the point. The South Carolina Constitu-
tion abrogated the rigors of the common law fellow-servant
doctrine with respect to railroads and clearly provided for future
extension of the statute to other areas of employment. The appli-
cable section of the Constitution states:
Every employee of any railroad corporation shall have
the same rights and remedies for any injury suffered by
13. PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (2d ed. 1955).
14. Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940).
15. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936).
16. Gray v. Wabash Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 92, 137 S.W. 324 (1911).
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him from the acts or omissions of said corporation or its
employees as are allowed by law to other persons not em-
ployees .... The General Assembly may extend the remedies
herein provided for to any other class of employees. 19
The sole purpose and effect of the constitutional section is to
limit the defense of the negligence of the fellow servant 2 in
conjunction with the abolition of the defense of assumption of
risk.21 It should be noted that this section does not violate the
Federal Constitution.22
The General Assembly of South Carolina followed the con-
stitutional tempor and extended the section to abrogate the com-
mon law immunity of municipal corporations from liability for
injuries caused by the negligent operation of vehicles under its
control.
Any person suffering bodily injuries . . . by reason of the
careless or negligent management or operation of any motor
vehicle under the control of any municipal corporation, en-
gaged in the business of such corporation, may recover in
any action against such corporation such actual damages,
not exceeding four thousand dollars, sustained by reason
thereof .... 23
The language of the statute at first glance would appear to
include fellow servants within the words, "Any person suffering
bodily injuries". The Supreme Court of the United States con-
strued such an expression in Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co.24 to the effect that the common law rule of the immunity of
the master from liability for the negligence of the fellow servants
was not abrogated. However, the Supreme Court in a later case
handed down the rule that such statutes in derogation of the
common law should be liberally construed to effect the purpose
for which they were enacted while withholding extension by
implication.
25
If the factual situation of the instant case were to arise in
South Carolina the writer feels that the decision of the case
19. S.C. CONST. art. 9, § 15 (1895).
20. Johnson v. Charleston & Savannah Ry., 55 S.C. 152, 32 S.E. 2 (1898).
21. Youngblood v. South Carolina & Georgia R.R., 60 S.C. 9, 38 S.E. 232
(1900).
22. Drennan v. Southern Ry., 91 S.C. 507, 75 S.E. 45 (1912).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-71 (1962).
24. 109 U.S. 478 (1883).
25. Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930).
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would be followed in holding that the common law fellow-
servant doctrine had been abrogated by statute.
The South Carolina Court has consistently adhered to a strict
doctrine of stare decisis while remaining adamant to policy con-
sideration conflicting to the contrary.26 The Court recently
reiterated its position in 1962 with regard to the doctrine in
Page v. Winter27 by holding the Court could not repudiate the
common law rule of not allowing a wife to maintain an action
for loss of consortium even though the Court thought the rule
illogical and undesirable.
The South Carolina Court has firmer ground for effecting the
same result as that reached by the New York Court in the in-
stant case. A comparison of the New York statute2 8 with the
South Carolina statute29 reveals that the South Carolina statute
is more emphatic toward absolute abrogation of the defense of
the fellow-servant doctrine. A fortiori, the same result should
be reached without violation of the rule of strict adherence to
stare decisis.
E. LIEGH HUNT
26. "But it is said it would be impolite to make defendants liable for any
injury occuring to firemen from the negligence of the engineer. This would be
worth inquiring into with great care in the legislature, but in a court I think
we have nothing to do with the policy of a case, the law of it is our guide."
Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 1 McMul. 385, 406 (S.C. 1841).
27. 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
28. N.Y. GEN. MUNICIPAL LAw §§ 50a, 50b.
29. S.C. CoDE AN. § 47-71 (1962).
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